

## *The Venezuela Briefing*

### **Episode 12: Evaluating the Barinas Election.**

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**Intro:** Venezuela is in crisis. Years of corruption, economic chaos, and a steady descent into authoritarianism have left it reeling. Now the country faces a deep political crisis, a humanitarian emergency, and the largest mass displacement in the region's history. But there is hope. Inside and outside of Venezuela, support for a peaceful, democratic solution is growing louder and louder. Welcome to the Venezuela Briefing, a WOLA podcast that highlights the work of activists, scholars and policymakers working to chart a new path forward in Venezuela.

**Geoff:** Welcome to the Venezuela Briefing. I'm Geoff Ramsey.

**Kristen:** And I'm Kristen Martínez-Gugerli, I'm the Program Associate for Venezuela.

**Geoff:** And, before we begin today's episode, we have some brief housekeeping notes. First of all, we just want to remind you to check out our Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights blog at [venezuelablog.org](http://venezuelablog.org) to see the latest news and analysis from WOLA's Venezuela program. Up right now you'll see an analysis of potential best-case, worst-case, and status quo scenarios for the year ahead, as well as the latest Venezuela Update, a regular summary of the latest on-the-ground news in Venezuela today. As a reminder, you can also sign up to receive our latest posts, including regular updates, via email on the blog.

**Kristen:** Yes, thank you Geoff. And so, before we begin today's show, we want to let you know that this is a special episode of the podcast. So, in a Venezuela Briefing first, we will be doing this episode entirely in Spanish. This is because we know that many of our listeners are bilingual, and the main objective of this podcast is to try and connect listeners in the global north and in the DC policymaking community with Venezuelan civil society. And for that reason, we want to try and experiment a little bit with doing some more Spanish episodes in 2022.

**Kristen:** Well, now we are going to switch to Spanish. (In Spanish) Like I said, this is a special episode of the podcast. For the first time, the episode will be done in Spanish because we know that much of our audience is bilingual and the objective of the podcast is to link our North American audience with Venezuelan civil society, so we hope to record more episodes in Spanish this year, in 2022. Today, we are very excited to have the opportunity to interview Eugenio Martínez. Eugenio is very well known in Venezuela as an expert on electoral matters, both by name and by his Twitter account, [@puzkas](https://twitter.com/puzkas).

**Kristen:** Eugenio is a social communicator specializing in the analysis of electoral and political issues. He worked for 17 years as head of the electoral coverage of the newspaper El Universal. As a journalist, he has taken charge of the more than 25 elections held in Venezuela since 1998. He is a lecturer and columnist for various information portals and is a member of the Electoral Experts Council of the Electoral Transparency organization. He is also the author of the book analyzing the commercial process of the year 2006 in Venezuela, which is called *Porque pasó lo que pasó* and he is co-author of the book *libro Más allá del movimiento estudiantil*, where the new political generation in Venezuela is analyzed. And more than anything, Eugenio is one of the smartest voices in Venezuela and is a good friend of WOLA and our team. Eugenio, thank you very much for being with us. It is a great pleasure to be able to talk with you today after such a politically and electorally historic day for Venezuela. Welcome!

**Eugenio:** Thank you Kristen. Thanks for that very kind introduction, Geoff. It is a pleasure to be with you in this space inaugurating the Spanish version of the podcast.

**Eugenio:** Happy New Year to all who listen to us and Happy Kings Day to those who have celebrated the Day of Kings.

**Geoff:** Well, thank you very much for being with us. Before we start, I just want to set the stage for those who are listening. On November 21, Venezuela had regional elections, that is, elections for governors and mayors. The election was held under fundamentally flawed conditions, but there were some

interesting developments that made this process at least different from some recent elections in Venezuela. The results were generally positive for the ruling party that won the governorships in 19 states.

**Geoff:** However, the opposition won in four states now adding the state of Barinas, as well as in 117 municipalities, especially at the municipal level, the opposition made some important gains, even though those elections were not free and fair, they have important lessons for the future. The most important irregularity occurred when the victory of the opposition in the state of Barinas was undermined by an irregular decision of the Supreme Court of Justice. This led to a repeat election on January 9 which the opposition won again. Eugenio. What happened in Barinas on January 9? And what implications does it have for the situation in Venezuela and for the regional elections in general?

**Eugenio:** Well, I think that in the Barinas case, it can be said that Barinas is Venezuela in a broad sense, based on everything that happened in the state between November 21 and January 9. Basically the trajectory. First of all, it should be noted that Barinas since 1998 has been governed by the Chávez family, first by Hugo Chávez's father, then by his brother, then by a cousin, and for two decades it has basically been the Chávez dynasty that has governed this entity in parallel. In those two decades, the opposition has always behaved dispersedly. In 1998 the opposition presented five candidates against the father of Hugo Chávez who ended up winning the election due to the dispersion of the opposition vote. And this dispersion of the opposition vote was also seen in 2008, when this dispersion once again allowed the Chávez family to maintain power. Or we saw it on November 21, when the dispersion of the opposition vote between the official opposition candidate Freddy Superlano and the candidate at that time of the Democratic Alliance practically divided or dispersed the opposition vote, facilitating that scenario of a difference of 0.5 less than 0.5 percentage points between Freddy Superlano and Argenis Chávez. Barinas is also Venezuela, because there is an exacerbated military control over the entity. It is an entity that is marked by drug trafficking routes, it is an entity marked by a border crossing. So in general terms, Barinas represents all that breeding ground of how bad Venezuela can be. It is the political point of view from the electoral point of view and in fact we saw an election in which Chavismo refused to recognize the Republic Plan. For a week, the military practically hijacked the tally sheets that could have made it possible to proclaim the then opposition candidate Freddy Superlano as governor, a totally irregular decision by the Supreme Court of Justice, the silence of the National Electoral Council regarding the Court's decision Supreme of Justice. All to not recognize the result of November 21. So there are many components that allow us to say that Barinas, a state of 600,000 voters, represents very well what Venezuela can be in an electoral event of magnitude where they are called into question or where the permanence of Nicolás Maduro in power. What changed the most from November 21, 2021 to January 9, 2022 is first that the opposition resolved to disperse the vote and failed. Chavismo was not able to disperse the vote, the opposition vote although Chavismo's six-week campaign to eliminate the gasoline subsidy, promised infrastructure repairs, giving away appliances, all that populist campaign structure has been able to help Chavismo to win the election in the past. If the opposition had maintained the dispersion of the vote on November 21, it was not so, to the point that there is a difference of almost 14 percentage points in three places. I think it was of the candidate now elected governor of the party and Jorge Arreaza, who was a former chancellor and the PSUV candidate in the State.

**Geoff:** And just to highlight that, for those who are listening to us, in the first round it can be written like that in the first election disqualified by the Supreme Court of Justice in the irregular decision of that body, it explicitly says that the opposition in that moment he won by a margin of about 150. I think it was 130 votes, right?

**Eugenio:** Right.

**Geoff:** And on January 9, the opposition this time beat the ruling party because that's 50,000 as you just said. I mean, where did those votes come from? How did they add almost 50,000 votes to the total in Barinas?

**Eugenio:** Well, first, the participation on the electoral registry obviously increased, which rose from 45 percent on November 21 to practically 52 percent yesterday, January 9. In any case, the victory of the opposition candidate Sergio Garrido can be explained basically through the strategy of unifying the opposition vote. It should be noted that in this case on the 21st, in this case on November 21, 26 percent

of the votes, 26 percent, let's say one out of every four votes. To summarize it this way, they went to different candidates from the PSUV and the MUD, and basically that one out of every four votes that is a different candidate, was a different candidate from the opposition in the state. While on January 9 only 3 to 4 percent of the votes were distributed among candidates other than Jorge Arreaza and Sergio Garrido. Basically, the increase in the opposition vote beyond the obvious due to greater participation is that the dispersion of the opposition vote did not exist or was minimal and its impact was really reduced on the general result.

**Kristen:** Thank you for that summary. And in your opinion in general, what are the great lessons learned from these last regional elections? For example, how have you interpreted the data on political participation, how do you compare the results at the municipal level versus governorates? And, in general, who won and who lost in this process? I understand it's a multi-part question, but there's a lot to go into.

**Eugenio:** If it is obviously the election on January 9, it is simply the end point of the process of governors and mayors that was convened for November 21, 2021. And that process was always focused as the starting point or the point of starting from the reconstruction of the electoral route and the reconstruction of what are the electoral competencies that the opposition lost from 2015 to 2021. Whether due to decisions of the National Electoral Council, the Supreme Court of Justice and also by the decision of the opposition not to participate from the processes of the year or not to participate in the electoral processes formally, after the regional elections of the year 2017. So the main gain beyond the numerical reading is what it can do, the main gain is from the qualitative perspective around the fact that the traditional opposition is once again framed in the electoral route, those competitions begin to rebuild technical knowledge that had been lost or had been discontinued. Voting is once again seen as an instrument for change and effective conflict resolution. And additionally, this not only happens within Venezuela, but outside the country. I think it is also relevant that the process on November 21 also tells the allies of the Venezuelan democratic cause that the electoral route, whether correctly analyzed or well structured, can serve as a resolution to or as the beginning of the resolution of the political conflict in the country. So I think the main gain is qualitative around redirecting the possible solution to the Venezuelan problem through the electoral route.

**Geoff:** I want to talk a little more about that, but first I think it's important that we haven't talked much about a key factor in these elections, which was the presence of international election observers and also domestic observers. On November 21, the elections were observed by views of the European Union and the Carter Center, in addition to a panel of UN experts. In the case of international observers, or at least in the case of the European Union and the Carter Center, they have issued preliminary reports that have generated a lot of headlines and quite a bit of interest internationally. What are the main conclusions about this electoral process of these international observers?

**Eugenio:** Yes, especially the preliminary report of the observation mission of the European Union already next month, in theory the final report should be delivered, but that preliminary report first emphasizes the lack of institutionality here in the country and the need to rescue institutionality and also rescue the separation of powers. For the rest, what the European Union report does is ratify things that Venezuelan civil society has already been denouncing and documenting. But the documentation of civil society is not the same as what an observation mission of the European Union says. In any case, that preliminary report and especially the final report that must be delivered next month, will serve as or should serve as a point of negotiation for what has to be the discussion of the electoral guarantees and conditions that any political event must have. election that is agreed as a way out of the country's crisis. The preliminary report of the European Union highlights, for example, the use and abuse of public resources for political proselytism. We saw it very well reflected in it. In the case of the state of Barinas, yesterday. Everything that has to do with the perception of the secrecy of the vote is also highlighted, the progress that has been made, yes, in the automated voting system, in the doubts generated by the automated voting system, the advances to try to reduce these doubts in political actors. So, in general terms, the report sets the starting point for the discussion that possibly has to take place at the negotiating table in Mexico, when it comes back to what the political agreements should be like and the technical electoral conditions of any type of election event. That I know, that I know that the Venezuelan conflict is agreed upon as a point of resolution.

**Geoff:** And in addition to the international observers, there was also an important deployment of observers at the national level and on the part of Venezuelan civil society. As you just said, there were important efforts from the Electoral Observatory of Venezuela, as well as the electoral observation networks of the Civil Association, Education Assembly and several others. What role did these Venezuelan organizations play in the observation? And was there any technical coordination between the observation at the national level and the international observation?

**Eugenio:** Yes, I think the first thing is to highlight that international observation stopped coming to Venezuela in 2006 and as of 2006. That process of formal documentation of the irregularities in the electoral processes fell on the national observation organizations, especially the Observatory Venezuelan Electoral, which at some point was called or was electoral in 2006 and the Education Assembly observation network, mainly between 2006 and 2021, carried all the weight. They also carried all the weight of documenting the legal, technical and political irregularities of the electoral process. To a good extent the work done by the observation mission of the European Union as the study mission of the Carter Center or the Study Panel of the United Nations, which was also in Venezuela on November 21, was based on the work that civil society organizations, observation organizations, civil society did for years. In general terms, we do not work, although the work of the European Union is independent, it has important support for what it has been doing or what the different national observation organizations in the country have been doing. Without this, without that previous work, it would have been much more complex or much more difficult to understand the scenario in which the elections of November 21 and the repetition of yesterday's January 9 were held.

**Kristen:** In your opinion, did it make any difference? The presence of international observers. What was the impact of this other observation in terms of the electoral conditions in practice, in this process?

**Eugenio:** It is a great question, Kristen, because the presence of the European Union observation mission especially generated a whole political debate about whether that mission was going to endorse the government, which was going to give legitimacy to the government of Nicolás Maduro. I believe that the first, and this not only applies to the Venezuelan case, it applies to any country. Observation missions are not electoral police. The observation missions do not go to guarantee that the guarantees of an election exist or not, that the guarantees of an election are fulfilled or not, but rather to document whether these guarantees actually exist and to make recommendations. And this is perhaps the key point of what will be the final report of the European Union and the UN panel of experts. And although it is a private report, the political actors will know at the time. They are the recommendations that can be made to improve the electoral practices, the conditions and the guarantees of the point. The most important thing about the presence of the European Union observation mission on November 21 has not yet happened, which are those recommendations and the lobbying that can be done to implement those recommendations. It is worth mentioning that the recommendations that the European Union made in 2005 and in 2006 in Venezuela were gradually implemented, although the Venezuelan government no longer allowed their presence in the country and a good part of those recommendations from 2005, of the year 2006, were the ones that in the long run allowed, for example, that the opposition had sufficient technical and political guarantees in the year 2015 to win the parliamentary election of that year or win, for example, the constitutional referendum of the year 2007.

**Geoff:** I well remember the controversy caused by the international observation announcement, but as you say, the international observers are not the police, but the whistleblowers or the impartial witnesses about what is really happening on the ground. I think it was very interesting for me to see how political actors reacted here in Washington who criticized the presence of international observers in Venezuela. After that came the well-founded reports from the Carter Center and also from the European Union. And I also saw that Juan Guaidó himself once cited the report, especially from the Europeans.

**Eugenio:** Sincerely allow me to interrupt you and because in reality that controversy still costs me to understand that controversy about the presence of observers in Venezuela, because since the government of Hugo Chávez at the time, already after Nicolás Maduro, practically prohibited the presence of observation broadcasts in the country in 2006, the main demand made year after year from Venezuelan politics and from the international community is that the return of international observers be allowed to document what was happening from a political perspective, from a technical perspective. And

basically we spent more than more than 15 years asking, demanding, lobbying for the observers to be allowed to return and at the time that was agreed, and then an unnecessary controversy was generated about the role of the observers. Yes, I think that this was more of a political than a technical controversy, but an unnecessary one, above all because it ended up making the role of the mission more difficult, especially that of the European Union mission, which is the one that had a much, much more high within, within the process of November 21.

**Geoff:** Well, speaking about political debates, in addition to international observation, these regional elections were held under a new National Electoral Council, with two of the five rectors being independent of the ruling party that this new CNE achieved and that we hope to see in the future so that the Elections in Venezuela are held in more competitive conditions.

**Eugenio:** If this CNE has important technical advances, perhaps it is a very technical issue that I am going to relate, but it is very useful for electoral control. They also imposed a lot to understand, for example, how yesterday, like January 9, it was known in advance that the opposition had won by a solid enough margin and that there was no reason, or that there was no way to manipulate that result that had managed to include in the tally sheets. A QR code that summarizes the result of the act and that allows political actors, in a matter of minutes, to have a projection of unofficial results, but a projection of results that is highly adjusted to reality. That, within the Venezuelan panorama, is a significant advance, especially when some political actors, in this case the Republic Plan, the military actors at some point tend to hijack that electoral material and the content of the minutes. So this CNE has a very important technical advance on the automated voting system and on the doubts generated by this new automated voting system. After that, after all the hardware was lost in the previous one in a fire whose causes are still unclear. This CNE, however, does still have political debts of advances in political guarantees that not only correspond to the National Electoral Council, but also to the Venezuelan political actors, although everything sounds contradictory. These two rectors, Enrique Márquez and Roberto Picón, were not linked to Chavismo and were practically alone during their first stage as rectors. They had the support of civil society, but they did not have the support of the rest of the political actors who were in the diatribe of whether to vote or not. on the 21st, on the 21st of November. And for the work of Picón and Marquez to be effective, they need political support not only within Venezuela, but also outside the country. This CNE needs to achieve a better balance in the regional electoral boards. This is also one of the preliminary recommendations of the European Union, for example.

**Geoff:** And the regional boards, just to explain well to people who are not experts on this subject, what are those regional boards?

**Eugenio:** The National Electoral Council is a centralized power in Venezuela. However, in each state there is a regional headquarters of the National Electoral Council that assumes the technical functions in that state. So the National National Council in Barinas has its National Electoral Board, in the State of Bolívar it also has one, and so on. Those National Boards of those regional directorates of the National Electoral Council in the past have been, if not totally, partially cut off by officials who are close to the government at the time of Hugo Chávez and now of Nicolás Maduro with very questionable decisions. In fact, the main one, the only documented fraud that exists in Venezuela, which is that of the regional elections of 2017, that regional authority had a significant role in that, in the manipulation of those results there is a pending point to win fairness and to gain transparency in the next electoral processes.

**Kristen:** And returning for a moment to the issue of the elections in Barinas, specifically on January 9 yesterday. Another important aspect of this process was the gigantic military presence that we saw in this and that second election on Sunday. So, what was the consequence of this militarization of the process?

**Eugenio:** Well, the militarization of the process is part of that strategy that Chavismo implemented in the State of Barinas since November 21. Because no, it cannot be forgotten that Chavismo increased its vote by thirty-seven forty-one percentage points between November 21 and January 9. How did you accomplish this? In mid-December, practically the entire military high command was deployed in Bolívar state. It was deployed in an attempt to intimidate 25,000 members of the entire security device between the military, militiamen and the security body. Along with the 16 ministers, for example, he transferred practically all the actions, as the Military High Command told them, to the entity he deployed a whole state mobilization to undertake works, repair infrastructure, distribute electrical appliances, and give

economic bonuses to voters. In the midst of the campaign, Chavismo eliminated the gasoline and fuel rationing system in the state of Barinas. They brought a system for filling gas cylinders from the state of Carabobo for domestic gas, from the state of Carabobo to the state of Barinas, they drilled wells and activated water extraction systems in some communities. This with the cooperation of the military personnel that in the end the military personnel ended up having a or tried to chavismo with this. An intimidating effect on the electorate, especially with everything that has to do with fear. Some kind of retaliation for not being able to vote against Chavismo. So in general terms, and it's not that Chavismo's campaign or strategy failed, it was effective in increasing Chavismo's vote. However, it did not allow them to win the governorship because the opposition prevented the dispersion of the vote. If the opposition had, if it had presented on January 9 as it did on November 21. All that strategy, including intimidation, would have been effective.

**Geoff:** Back to the big picture, now. How do these regional elections leave us? There are people who have talked about the possibility that the opposition could perhaps organize a recall referendum. There are perhaps expectations about the possibility that the organization can be reorganized before the presidential elections in 2024. How do you see the general panorama in Venezuela today, after these regional elections and what are your expectations for the months and years to come now?

**Eugenio:** Yes, I think that at the beginning of the conversation I highlighted that November 21 was the starting point for the recovery of the electoral route and the recovery of the electoral route. From my perspective, it is a process that goes from the year 2021, on November 21, 2021, until practically the year 2025 with the next parliamentary elections. In other words, the re-institutionalization of the country and trying to begin to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela cannot be centered on a single electoral event. This should be a set of events, although evidently a presidential election takes the, perhaps the greatest importance of that process between the year 2022 and the year 2025. That said, and although there are many factors, there are some factors in Venezuela promoting the activation of a presidential recall referendum. In fact, today that we are talking is the legal starting point for that to start requesting that recall referendum. I think that here we should focus on what was the experience of the year 2004. The recall referendum against Hugo Chávez was only possible when there was a greater political agreement for the recall referendum to be held. Although this is a guarantee. This is a right that is enshrined in the Venezuelan Constitution. Unfortunately, this is an event that requires political consensus for it to take place. Especially now that there are some rules from the technical point of view that make it practically unfeasible to activate the recall referendum if those rules are not negotiated or discussed at an agreement table. Think about the possibility of a recall referendum without this recall referendum being, the political and technical conditions are previously agreed in a space like Mexico as an alternative space to Mexico. I think it doesn't have to, I think it doesn't make much sense and what it's going to generate and I hope it doesn't. Yesterday's victory in Barinas could also generate a crisis of expectations in the Venezuelan opposition. The Venezuelan opposition no, it has not been entirely assertive in the past, in knowing how to handle its triumphs. This did not happen in 2007, it happened in 2015.

We hope that this regional victory, but very symbolic because of the characteristic that Chavismo wanted to give to the lesson in Barinas, did not generate a new crisis of expectation within the Venezuelan political class and within the international allies. Is worth to say. In any case, although there are some sectors promoting this recall referendum, I think that any proposal for the Venezuelan crisis must inevitably go through the negotiating table in Mexico or through any other similar process. And from the outset, although the presidential election is in 2024, two years from selection, we have to start working from the point of view of technical guarantees, political guarantees, the presence of international observers and we have to start working on that route. Yes, indeed the deadline for that presidential election in 2024.

**Kristen:** I am glad that you mentioned the political negotiation process, because this last question that I am going to ask you is related to that same topic. So, in your opinion, what do these results from Sunday in Barinas mean for the negotiation process in Mexico, which was suspended in October? Do you think that the results in Barinas offer the ruling party a new incentive to participate or reactivate this process?

**Eugenio:** I think the issue with the ruling party is that you have to see it from the perspective of a reformist group, where we can include Nicolás Maduro, the Rodríguez brothers, Tareck El Aissami, the

Minister of Petroleum Art and a much more conservative group where we can include the military sector Diosdado Cabello, Francisco. These two groups in general are not necessarily equally aligned on what the strategy in Mexico has to be. Something similar, evidently, occurs in the Venezuelan opposition. Not all opposition groups or those that make up the Venezuelan opposition are aligned around Mexico's strategy. However, within the catastrophic tie that exists in Venezuela, where Chavismo cannot impose itself and erase the opposition from the political landscape, and the opposition cannot impose Chavismo and erase them from the political landscape either. The solution to the Venezuelan process inevitably passes through a table of agreement, be it in Mexico or elsewhere. I think that the negotiation processes that we have come to, that we have been seeing since 2017, first in the Dominican, first in Caracas, then in the Dominican, then the process between Oslo, Barbados. Now the process of Mexico. Each of these processes has been decanting in a better strategy, in a better, in a professionalization of the conversation process. I believe that this year 2022 is key for that professional process of talks between that reformist sector of the Venezuelan government and the Venezuela Unitary Platform, where most of the political forces or the main political forces of Venezuela are grouped. The results of November 21 plus those of January 9 yesterday should push that to renew that conversation table sometime in January or February. Understanding that if there is not that. That conversation between the parties is hardly going to break the catastrophic tie that exists in our country. And unfortunately, while there is this catastrophic tie where no sector manages to impose itself on the other and despite the precariousness of the advancing country, despite that precariousness, the status quo, in this case Maduro, continues to hold on to power. That's something you can't, can't stop saying to each other. That is why the process of conversation and negotiation in Mexico or in any other instance is so necessary. But it takes a resumption of that conversation process.

**Geoff:** Well, let's hope that this year brings good things in Mexico or at least in Caracas. Eugenio. Thank you very much for being with us. I want to invite everyone who is listening to us to follow his work through social networks. You can be found via username Puskas if I'm not mistaken, if you want to add something more specific about projects you currently have.

**Eugenio:** It's good, but actually I think I would like to first thank WOLA for its work on Venezuela, the interest it gives to Venezuela and everything that the WOLA office has done to try to find a path of understanding among Venezuelans and how there is a large audience in Washington. I would like to say that it is necessary for the audiences in Washington to open their perspectives or listen to other voices within the Venezuelan political dynamic. This is not about substituting one voice for another, but about complementing voices, of complementing approaches. Because what is most needed for this year 2022 is that, to complement those approaches to find some kind of agreement, a solution to the Venezuelan political crisis. I give again the example of the 2004 recall, the 2004 recall against Chávez as a business process. Action was successful. The problem is that the result of the referendum was not what was expected, but that recall was practically a year of negotiation, where at that time the Secretary General of the OAS, Mr. Gaviria, sat down at a negotiating table where both parties settled professionally. I believe that any solution that is proposed for the Venezuelan case inevitably goes through one, through a table of understanding, agreements, negotiation and surely many of the people who listen to us in DC have a lot to contribute to that process.

**Geoff:** Surely. Well, thank you very much, Eugenio.

**Kristen:** Yes, thank you very much for joining us.

**Eugenio:** Thanks to you. May the force be with you.

**Outro:** Thank you for listening to the Venezuela Briefing Podcast. To learn more visit WOLA's Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights Blog at [www.venezuelablog.org](http://www.venezuelablog.org) and subscribe to receive our episodes in your feed as soon as they come out. And of course, don't forget to rate this podcast and leave feedback so we can work with you to produce the content that you want to hear. Thanks again, and until next time on the Venezuela Briefing.