The recent opposition electoral victory in Barinas state—and more importantly, the government’s apparent acknowledgment of its loss in the Chavista stronghold—has provided a small but satisfying boost to many Venezuelans hoping for a peaceful, democratic solution inside the country. While the long-term ramifications of the vote remain to be seen, it comes at an important time. As Venezuela enters another year in a deep political and humanitarian crisis, policymakers in Washington and the international community are evaluating possible scenarios for 2022.
Let’s sketch out the best-case, worst-case, and status quo outcomes for the coming year. The following scenarios are by no means exhaustive, nor are they necessarily mutually exclusive. Conditions in Venezuela could improve in one metric while worsening drastically in another. In each case, however, it is clear that decisions made in Washington over the next twelve months will impact likely outcomes. While the U.S. cannot unilaterally resolve Venezuela’s crisis, it is an essential actor in the multilateral search for a solution.
Assuming things stay as they are, the status quo in 2022 probably looks something like this:
U.S. Policy
- The Biden administration, facing competing regional priorities, domestic political constraints in the Senate as well as 2022 midterm elections which all limit their appetite for risks, keeps policy on autopilot. The White House voices support for eventual negotiations but does not actively use existing leverage to shift regime incentives, essentially keeping the current “maximum pressure” strategy in place.
Prospects for a Democratic Solution
- The Maduro government, having learned to adapt to harsh U.S. sanctions and seeing no sign of relief on the table, perceives few incentives to engage in negotiations. So it makes purely symbolic concessions (or none at all), and continues to insist on preconditions for negotiations that are highly unlikely—like asking the U.S. to free alleged Colombian money launderer Alex Saab.
- The political parties in the opposition continue to lose credibility and support, both among the Venezuelan people and the international community, amid squabbles over resources and influence in the interim government.
Justice and Human Rights
- Continued government repression, including crimes against humanity such as arbitrary imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, and persecution on political grounds.
- Independent civil society continues to resist, and spaces of non-violent democratic innovation remain, but they continue to be persecuted and threatened by the government.
- The ICC Prosecutor’s investigation into crimes against humanity since 2017 in Venezuela continues apace. Since talks over meaningful judicial reforms remain suspended, the government responds by announcing superficial and unilateral judicial reforms like a bill introduced in December—which makes only cosmetic changes like reducing the number of judges on the Supreme Court.
Humanitarian Crisis
- U.S. contributions to the UN Humanitarian Response Plan inside Venezuela remain at 2021 levels, with around 40% funded.
- The increased transmissibility of the Omicron strain of COVID-19 combined with low rates of full vaccination (just 40% have received more than one dose) lead to a much higher hospitalization rate, further straining a dysfunctional health system—and highlighting the urgent need for humanitarian accords.
- Improvised dollarization and stealth economic reforms continue, leading to annual economic growth of perhaps 7 percent for the first time since 2013, but also deepening inequality and corruption. The need for greater humanitarian assistance deepens.
Migrant and Refugee Rights
- The number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, currently estimated at 6 million, continues to grow, with an estimated 8 million people around the region and the communities hosting them in need of assistance, according to the UN.
- U.S. contributions to the joint IOM-UNHCR appeal for fleeing Venezuelan migrants and refugees remain at 2021 levels (45% funded). The UN regional response will have an increased focus on the long-term needs of migrants and refugees, and regional governments may adopt more policies related to regularization and socioeconomic integration, but the level of need will remain dire.
- Venezuelan migrants and refugees will continue to be disproportionately impacted by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in their host countries, with many being forced to flee again. Venezuelans will comprise an increasing percentage of migrants arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border.
A worst-case scenario for 2022 might include some or all of the below:
U.S. Policy
- The U.S. government undermines or fails to significantly promote negotiations, like the previous administration did in 2019. New sectoral sanctions could further aggravate fuel shortages in the interior of the country, and derail forecasts of modest economic growth.
- In a worst case scenario, we could see the return of “all options on the table” rhetoric in Washington, which only contributed to opposition divisions and unified members of Maduro’s inner circle against a common threat.
Prospects for a Democratic Solution
- Maduro begins a dramatic uptick in already brutal repression, with an emboldened government ramping up arrests and persecution of opposition politicians, NGOs, and human rights activists, potentially sending all perceived critics into exile.
Justice and Human Rights
- Stricter enforcement of new regulations which aim to restrict dissent in civic spaces (see Providencia Administrativa No. 002-2021), with organizations that do not register with anti-terrorism authorities facing reprisals and criminalization.
- Alternatively, the pro-government National Assembly could pass a proposed a “Law of International Cooperation” that would impose additional restrictions on organizations that receive international support. While any further crimes would occur in the context of the ICC Prosecutor’s investigation, this process will take time.
- Without continued international support, the UN Fact-Finding Mission for Venezuela’s mandate expires in September 2022. Geopolitical divisions in this year’s Human Rights Council (Russia, China, and the United States are all members this year) could complicate efforts to renew the initiative.
- Bolder action by non-state armed groups across the country, with violent clashes like those seen recently in Monagas and Apure occurring on a larger scale, perhaps triggering worsened military tensions along the Colombian border. This increases the likelihood of armed conflict, elevating the risk of mass atrocities.
Humanitarian Crisis
- A closing of humanitarian space, with Venezuelan and international humanitarian organizations being unable to complete their missions. Local aid groups faced continued repression in 2021, and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted ongoing “administrative and bureaucratic impediments” in its 2021 needs overview for Venezuela, suggesting that gains in humanitarian access are still fragile.
Migrant and Refugee Rights
- A worsening of humanitarian conditions sparks a dramatic increase in the rate of individuals fleeing Venezuela. This, coupled with growing regional fatigue regarding the crisis, results in more governments across the hemisphere closing their doors to Venezuelan migrants and refugees—a trend which gained steam in 2021.
By contrast, a best-case scenario for 2022 might include the following elements:
U.S. Policy
- U.S. policy inertia comes to an end. A road map pairing sanctions relief with democratic reforms is carefully coordinated with Venezuelan and international allies, while the White House takes care not to impose its own agenda on a Venezuelan-led process.
- Even outside the context of negotiations, the Biden administration devotes more relevant personnel and resources to the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, to address the serious problem of overcompliance and remedy unintended consequences of sanctions on the broader public, such as contributing to fuel scarcity.
- The Biden administration commits to a fully-funded humanitarian response inside Venezuela, and to increasing funds for the joint IOM-UNHCR regional response to fleeing Venezuelans.
Prospects for a Democratic Solution
- Maduro and key members of his coalition perceive a clear benefit to participating in negotiations focused on overdue and fair elections, and addressing the humanitarian emergency. The opposition succeeds in its goal of pressing meaningful advances in the negotiating table, with a focus on judicial reforms and holding overdue free and fair presidential elections by 2024.
Humanitarian Crisis
- Negotiations start with humanitarian accords. Humanitarian agreements build on the lessons learned from 2020 humanitarian agreements, which resulted in health workers having improved access to personal protective equipment, and international agencies such as PAHO and UNICEF being better-positioned.
Justice and Human Rights
- Continued mobilization, documentation, and denunciation by Venezuelan and international civil society, raises the cost of government repression.
- With the support of committed human rights defenders, Human Rights Council members renew the mandate of the UN Fact-Finding Mission for Venezuela before it expires in 2022.
- The ICC prosecutor’s investigation, combined with the existence of a negotiating table in which the opposition seeks to promote judicial reforms, help spur meaningful discussion of restoring the country’s justice institutions. The UN Fact Finding Mission on Venezuela has made 45 concrete recommendations for actions to be taken to overhaul Venezuela’s judiciary and restore its independence. The discussion should start with these recommendations.
Migrant and Refugee Rights
- U.S. contributions to the joint IOM-UNHCR appeal for fleeing Venezuelan migrants and refugees increase compared to 2021 levels.
- Beyond the UN appeal, governments across the hemisphere (including the U.S. government) heed continued pressure from regional civil society to broaden access to regular status for fleeing Venezuelans, either in a coordinated way through forums such as the Quito Process or separately on the national level.
To be clear, none of these scenarios depend solely on the actions of the U.S. government. Without mobilization by Venezuelan protagonists, and significant reforms and concessions from the de facto Maduro government, the status quo is essentially guaranteed. But in each of these scenarios, the United States government has a role to play.
In this context, the January 4 statement by State Department Spokesman Ned Price was surprising. In addition to echoing U.S. support for the Guaidó coalition and non-recognition of Maduro, Price said the U.S. would continue to work with multilateral partners for a political solution, calling on Maduro to “reengage in the negotiations in Mexico, and to do so in good faith for the benefit of the Venezuelan people.”
This emphasis on negotiations as the only viable way forward is laudable. But it is odd to see the U.S. call on a corrupt, authoritarian government—one that promotes impunity for crimes against humanity and has abused talks in the past—to spontaneously do the right thing without working on changing Maduro’s incentives. Whether this entails presenting the regime with a step-by-step road map for democratic advances, or encouraging preliminary backchannel talks, the White House can’t sit back and hope negotiations resume in good faith. It should actively support efforts by international and Venezuelan stakeholders to revive them.
The Biden administration can either sit back and hope that Maduro resumes talks in good faith, or they can work to maximize the odds of this happening—even if that means taking risks in a midterm election year.